mastodon.ie is one of the many independent Mastodon servers you can use to participate in the fediverse.
Irish Mastodon - run from Ireland, we welcome all who respect the community rules and members.

Administered by:

Server stats:

1.7K
active users

#impersonation

2 posts1 participant0 posts today

🚨 Identity fraud on Mastodon

Just a reminder that there is a lot of identity fraud happening on the internet, increasingly on Mastodon as well.

Often impersonators are easy to detect (like the ones below) - but sometimes existing accounts are taken over by criminals. Always keep in mind that someone on the internet interacting with you may (currently) not be who they claim to be.

This includes my account. If it does not sound like me, it may not be me. Having doubts and double checking are good habits. Reputation (good or bad) is a useful property for knowing who you're dealing with, and to help detect anomalies.

Accounts with a few or 0 followers, and hardly any or just plain pointless toots, may be bots or criminals coming after your money.

If someone appears to only follow random Mastodonts with lots of followers, either they're noobs or they're here with less friendly intentions. If they then start following possibly lonely people, they *may* be trying to gain their attention and trust - maybe for nefarious purposes.

🤔 Recently the following people started following the automated channel mastodon.world/@auschwitzmuseu:

Kendal Jenner [1]
Jennifer Aniston [2]
Stephen King [3]
Keanu Reeves [4]
Keanu Reeves [5]

They all abuse the pictures of the real persons they impersonate (they're not just following the Auschwitz Memorial BTW).

[1] mastodon.social/@kendall01/fol
[2] mastodon.social/@Jenniferanist
[3] mastodon.social/@Stevenkvng/fo
[4] mastodon.social/@keanureeves19
[5] mastodon.social/@reeves001/fol (screenshot below)

"Franse overheid voert phishingtest uit op 2,5 miljoen leerlingen"
security.nl/posting/881630/Fra

KRANKZINNIG!

Het is meestal onmogelijk om nepberichten (e-mail, SMS, ChatApp, social media en papieren post - zie plaatje) betrouwbaar van echte te kunnen onderscheiden.

Tegen phishing en vooral nepwebsites is echter prima iets te doen, zoals ik vandaag nogmaals beschreef in security.nl/posting/881655.

(Big Tech en luie websitebeheerders willen dat niet, dus is en blijft het een enorm gevecht).

Replied in thread

@mensrea : if you visit a shop (or a bank) in the center of the city, chances are near zero that it's run by impostors.

However, if you go to some vague second hand market, chances are the you will be deceived.

Possibly worse, if there's an ATM on the outside wall of a shack where Hells Angels meet, would you insert your bank card and enter your PIN?

On the web, most people do not know WHERE they are.

Big Tech is DELIBERATELY withholding essential information from people, required to determine the amount of trust that a website deserves.

DELIBERATELY, because big tech can rent much more (cheap) hosting and (meaningless) domain names to whomever if website vistors cannot distinguish between authentic and fake websites.

You are right that some people will never understand why they need to know who owns a website.

However, most people (including @troyhunt ) would enormously benefit.

Like all the other deaf and blind trolls, you trash a proposal because it may be useless for SOME, you provide zero solutions and you keep bashing me.

What part of "get lost" do you not understand?

@aral @EUCommission @letsencrypt @nlnet

Replied in thread
Infosec ExchangeErik van Straten (@ErikvanStraten@infosec.exchange)Attached: 1 image @aral@mastodon.ar.al : most Let's Encrypt (and other Domain Validated) certificates are issued to junk- or plain criminal websites. They're the ultimate manifestation of evil big tech. They were introduced to encrypt the "last mile" because Internet Service Providers were replacing ads in webpages and, in the other direction, inserting fake clicks. DV has destroyed the internet. People loose their ebank savings and companies get ransomwared; phishing is dead simple. EDIW/EUDIW will become an identity fraud disaster (because of AitM phishing atracks). Even the name "Let's Encrypt" is wrong for a CSP: nobody needs a certificate to encrypt a connection. The primary purpose of a certificate is AUTHENTICATION (of the owner of the private key, in this case the website). However, for human beings, just a domain name simply does not provide reliable identification information. It renders impersonation a peace of cake. Decent online authentication is HARD. Get used to it instead of denying it. REASONS/EXAMPLES 🔹 Troy Hunt fell in the DV trap: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114222237036021070 🔹 Google (and Troy Hunt!) killed non-DV certs (for profit) because of the stripe.com PoC. Now Chrome does not give you any more info than what Google argumented: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114224682101772569 🔹 https:⧸⧸cancel-google.com/captcha was live yesterday: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114224264440704546 🔹 Stop phishing proposal: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/113079966331873386 🔹 Lots of reasons why LE sucks: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/112914047006977222 (corrected link 09:20 UTC) 🔹 This website stopped registering junk .bond domain names, probably because there were too many every day (the last page I found): https://newly-registered-domains.abtdomain.com/2024-08-15-bond-newly-registered-domains-part-1/. However, this gang is still active, open the RELATIONS tab in https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/13.248.197.209/relations. You have to multiply the number of LE certs by approx. 5 because they also register subdomains and don't use wildcard certs. Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revolver-rabbit-gang-registers-500-000-domains-for-malware-campaigns/ @EUCommission@ec.social-network.europa.eu @letsencrypt @nlnet@nlnet.nl #Authentication #Impersonation #Spoofing #Phishing #DV #GoogleIsEvil #BigTechIsEvil #Certificates #httpsVShttp #AitM #MitM #FakeWebsites #CloudflareIsEvil #bond #dotBond #Spam #Infosec #Ransomware #Banks #CloudflareIsEvil #FakeWebsites
Replied in thread

@aral : most Let's Encrypt (and other Domain Validated) certificates are issued to junk- or plain criminal websites.

They're the ultimate manifestation of evil big tech.

They were introduced to encrypt the "last mile" because Internet Service Providers were replacing ads in webpages and, in the other direction, inserting fake clicks.

DV has destroyed the internet. People loose their ebank savings and companies get ransomwared; phishing is dead simple. EDIW/EUDIW will become an identity fraud disaster (because of AitM phishing atracks).

Even the name "Let's Encrypt" is wrong for a CSP: nobody needs a certificate to encrypt a connection. The primary purpose of a certificate is AUTHENTICATION (of the owner of the private key, in this case the website).

However, for human beings, just a domain name simply does not provide reliable identification information. It renders impersonation a peace of cake.

Decent online authentication is HARD. Get used to it instead of denying it.

REASONS/EXAMPLES

🔹 Troy Hunt fell in the DV trap: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 Google (and Troy Hunt!) killed non-DV certs (for profit) because of the stripe.com PoC. Now Chrome does not give you any more info than what Google argumented: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 https:⧸⧸cancel-google.com/captcha was live yesterday: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 Stop phishing proposal: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 Lots of reasons why LE sucks:
infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat (corrected link 09:20 UTC)

🔹 This website stopped registering junk .bond domain names, probably because there were too many every day (the last page I found): newly-registered-domains.abtdo. However, this gang is still active, open the RELATIONS tab in virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/. You have to multiply the number of LE certs by approx. 5 because they also register subdomains and don't use wildcard certs. Source: bleepingcomputer.com/news/secu

@EUCommission @letsencrypt @nlnet

Replied in thread

@BjornW :

I've stopped doing that after a lot of people called me an idiot and a liar if I kindly notified them. I stopped, I'll get scolded anyway.

Big tech and most admins want everyone to believe that "Let's Encrypt" is the only goal. Nearly 100% of tech people believe that.

And admins WANT to believe that, because reliable authentication of website owners is a PITA. They just love ACME and tell their website visitors to GFY.

People like you tooting nonsense get a lot of boosts. It's called fake news or big tech propaganda. If you know better, why don't you WRITE BETTER?

It has ruined the internet. Not for phun but purely for profit. And it is what ruins people's lives and lets employees open the vdoor for ransomware and data-theft.

See also infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat (and, in Dutch, security.nl/posting/881296).

@troyhunt @letsencrypt

Infosec ExchangeErik van Straten (@ErikvanStraten@infosec.exchange)🌘DV-CERT MIS-ISSUANCES & OCSP ENDING🌒 🧵#1/3 On Jul 23, 2024, Josh Aas of Let's Encrypt wrote, while his nose was growing rapidly: <<< Intent to End OCSP Service [...] We plan to end support for OCSP primarily because it represents a considerable risk to privacy on the Internet. [...] CRLs do not have this issue. >>> https://letsencrypt.org/2024/07/23/replacing-ocsp-with-crls.html 🚨 On THAT SAME DAY, Jul 23, 2024, LE (Let's Encrypt) issued at least 34 certs (certificates) for [*.]dydx.exchange to cybercriminals, of which LE revoked 27 mis-issued certs approximately 6.5 hours later. Note that falsified DNS records may instruct DNS caching servers to retain entries for a long time; therefore speedy revocation helps reducing the number of victims. Apart from this mis-issuance *blunder*, CRL's have HUGE issues that Josh does not mention: they are SSSLLLOOOWWW and files are potentially huge - while OCSP is instantaneous and uses little bandwith. 🌘NO OCSP INCREASES INTERNET RISKS🌒 If LE quits OCSP support, the average risk of using the internet will *increase*. 🌘LIES🌒 Furthermore, the privacy argument is mostly moot, as nearly every website makes people's browsers connect to domains owned by Google (and even let's those browsers execute Javascript from third party servers, allowing nearly unlimited espionage). In addition, IP-addresses are sent in the plain anyway (📎). (📎 When using a VPN, source and destination IP-addresses *within the tunnel* are not visible for anyone with access to the *outside* of the tunnel - but they are sent in the plain between the end of the tunnel and the actual server.) Worse, the remote endpoint of your E2EE https connection increasingly often is *not* the actual server (that website was moved to sombody else's server in the cloud anyway), but a CDN proxy server which has the ability to monitor everything you do (unencrypting your data: three letter agencies love it, FISA section 702 grants them unlimmited access - without anyone informing you). 🤷 LE may try to blame others for their mis-issuance blunder, but *THEY* chose to use old, notoriously untrustworthy, internet protocols (BGP and DNS, including database records - that DNSSEC will never protect) as the basis for authentication. By making that choice, LE and other DV cert suppliers were simply ASKING for trouble. 🔓 In fact, the promise that Let's Encrypt would make the internet safer was misleading from the start: domain names are mostly meaningless to users, 100% fault intolerant, unpredictable and easily forgotten. If your browser is communicating with a malicious server, encryption is pointless. Josh, stop lying to us; your motives are purely economical. 🌘CORRUPT: BIG TECH FACILITATES CRIME🌒 DV-certs were heavily promoted by Google (not for phun but for profit) after their researchers "proved" that it was possible to show misleasing identification information in the browser's address bar after certificate mis-issuance (the "Stripe, Inc" incident, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/12/nope-this-isnt-the-https-validated-stripe-website-you-think-it-is/). This message was repeated by many specialists (e.g. https://www.troyhunt.com/paypals-beautiful-demonstration-of-extended-validation-fud/) with stupid arguments: certificates do NOT directly warrant reliable websites. OV and EV certificates, and QWAC's, more or less reliably, warrant *WHO OWNS* a domain name. That means that users know *who* they're doing business with, can depend on their reputation and can sue them if they violate laws. "Of course" Google recently lost trust in Entrust for mis-issuing certificates (https://security.googleblog.com/2024/06/sustaining-digital-certificate-security.html). Meanwhile the internet has become a corrupt and criminal mess; its users get to see misleading identification info in their browser's address bar WAY MORE OFTEN, e.g. https:⁄⁄us–usps–ny.com (for loads of examples see https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.114.96.0/relations; tap ••• a couple of times). Supporting DN's like "ing–movil.com" and "m–santander.de" *is* facilitating cybercrime, by repeatedly mis-issuing certs for them (see https://crt.sh/?q=ing-movil.com and https://crt.sh/?q=m-santander.de) and by letting them hide behind a CDN (see https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/ing-movil.com/details and https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/m-santander.de/details). In addition, *thousands* of DV-certs have been mis-issued - without *their* issuers getting distrusted by Google, Microsoft, Apple and Mozilla. People have their bank accounts drained and companies get slammed with ransomware because of this. But no Big Tech company (including the likes of Cloudflare) takes ANY responsibility; they make Big Money by facilitating cybercrime. Not by issuing "free" DV-certs, but by selling domain names, server space and CDN functionality, and by letting browsers no longer distinguish between useful and useless certs. They've deliberately made the internet insecure *FOR PROFIT*. 🌘CERT MIS-ISSUANCE ROOT CAUSE🌒 The mis-issuance of LE certs was caused by the unauthorized modification of customer DNS records managed by SquareSpace; this incident was further described in https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/defi-exchange-dydx-v3-website-hacked-in-dns-hijack-attack/. Note that a similar attack, also affecting SquareSpace customers, occurred on July 11, 2024 (see https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dns-hijacks-target-crypto-platforms-registered-with-squarespace/). Even if it *looks like* that no certs were mis-issued during the July 11 incident, because (AFAIK) none of them have been revoked, this does not warrant that none of them were mis-issued; such certs can still be abused by attackers, albeit on a smaller scale. 🌘MORE INFO🌒 Please find additional information in two followups of this toot: 🧵#2/3 Extensive details regarding Mis-issued dydx.exchange certs on 2024-07-23; 🧵#3/3 Links to descriptions of multiple other DV-cert mis-issuance issues. 🌘DISCLAIMER🌒 I am not (and have never been) associated with any certificate supplier. My goal is to obtain a safer internet, in particular for users who are not forensic experts. It is *way* too hard for ordinary internet users to destinguish between 'fake' and 'authentic' on the internet. Something that, IMO, can an must significantly improve ASAP. Edited 08:16 UTC to add people: @troyhunt @dangoodin @BleepingComputer @agl #DV #LE #LetsEncrypt #Certificates #Certs #Misissuance #Mis_issuance #Revocation #Revoked #Weaknessess #WeakCertificates #WeakAuthentication #Authentication #Impersonation #Identification #Infosec #DNS #DNSHijacks #SquareSpace #Authorization #UnauthorizedChanges #UnauthorizedModifications #DeFi #dydx_exchange #CryptoCoins
Replied in thread

@troyhunt : if we open a website that we've never visited before, we need browsers to show us all available details about that website, and warn us if such details are not available.

We also need better (readable) certificates identifying the responsible / accountable party for a website.

We have been lied to that anonymous DV certificates are a good idea *also* for websites we need to trust. It's a hoax.

Important: certificates never directly warrant the trustworthyness of a website. They're about authenticity, which includes knowing who the owner is and in which country they are located. This helps ensuring that you can sue them (or not, if in e.g. Russia) which *indirectly* makes better identifiable websites more reliable.

More info in infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat (see also crt.sh/?Identity=mailchimp-sso).

Note: most people do not understand certificates, like @BjornW in mastodon.social/@BjornW/114064:

@letsencrypt offers certificates to encrypt the traffic between a website & your browser.

2x wrong.

A TLS v1.3 connection is encrypted before the website sends their certificate, which is used only for *authentication* of the website (using a digital signature over unguessable secret TLS connection parameters). A cert binds the domain name to a public key, and the website proves possession of the associated private key.

However, for people a domain name simply does not suffice for reliable identification. People need more info in the certificate and it should be shown to them when it changes.

Will you please help me get this topic seriously on the public agenda?

Edited 09:15 UTC to add: tap "Alt" in the images for details.

Replied in thread

@Linux : you're definitely not fearmongering.

Eugene Kaspersky warned many times for fragmentation of the internet, like in smh.com.au/technology/cyber-sp more than 11 years ago:

Mr Kaspersky said he feared governments would withdraw to their own parallel networks away from the prying eyes of others, and would cease investing in the development of the public internet, products and services.

(An IMO nice read on internet history: eugene.kaspersky.com/2017/02/0).

Personally I predicted many years ago that online identity fraud would cause too much damage soon.

Fortunately both predictions have not fully materialized, but we're definitely heading in the wrong direction.

Here's one example from many, severly undermining trust in the internet: bleepingcomputer.com/news/secu.

It's not just TLD's: by far most digital certificates are issued by Big Tech with pompous names like "Google Trust Services" - most of them to criminal websites.

See also gist.githubusercontent.com/qbo (src: @_r_netsec in infosec.exchange/@_r_netsec/11).

The Sydney Morning Herald · Cyber spying risks the future of the internet: Eugene KasperskyBy Lia Timson

"Character.AI, the Google-backed chatbot startup embroiled in two separate lawsuits over the welfare of minor users, was caught hosting at least four publicly-facing impersonations of Sewell Setzer III — the 14-year-old user of the platform who died by suicide after engaging extensively with Character.AI bots, and whose death is at the heart of one of the two lawsuits against the company.

The chatbot impersonations use variations of Setzer's name and likeness, and in some cases refer to the deceased teen in openly mocking terms. They were all accessible through Character.AI accounts listed as belonging to minors, and were easily searchable on the platform. Each impersonation was created by a different Character.AI user."

futurism.com/chatbot-impersona

Futurism · Google-Backed Chatbot Platform Caught Hosting AI Impersonations of 14-Year-Old User Who Died by SuicideBy Maggie Harrison Dupré

#wildlife #wildlifephotography #film #video #bbc #davidattenborough #uk #tv #television #british #britain #birds #lyre #lyrebird #australia #australian #impersonation #animal #animals
Probably one of the most amazing wildlife clips you’ll ever see, and it never grows old. The unbelievable Lyre Bird. Anyone who underestimates animals should check this out.
If you haven’t seen the clip, make sure you do, and stick with it until the end. It’s brilliant and well worth it!
youtube.com/watch?v=VjE0Kdfos4

@zak @zenbrowser : a still unfixed vulnerability: if NOT using Touch ID, on some websites you may be able to sign in using a passkey WITHOUT authenticating locally - using biometrics or your passcode (screen unlock code).

⛓️💥 This vulnerability also exists WITH Touch ID set up, provided that "Password Autofill" is disabled.

BTW this vulnerability also permits access to:
icloud.com
account.apple.com
(When asked to provide your fingerprint, tap the X at the top right and tap in the "Email" field one more time).

This is a HUGE risk for people who do not want to use biometrics: if a thief grabs their iPhone when unlocked, or watches them enter their passcode and later steals their iPhone, the thief can use ALL of the owner's passwords and some of their passkeys stored in the "Passwords" app (formerly known as iCloud Keychain).

🎬 This increases the risks of theft as shown by WSJ's Joanna Stern in youtube.com/watch?v=QUYODQB_2wQ.

👶 In addition, a (grand) child or anyone else who (shortly) borrows your iPhone/iPad may have access to more of your cloud-accounts than you're aware of.

🔧 Workaround if you don't want to use biometrics to unlock your iPhone/iPad (this does not fix any problem if a thief learns (or successfully guesses) your passcode (screen unlock PIN or password):

• Set up a Touch ID anyway, for example for your left pinky finger (if you're righthanded)

• Disable "iPhone Unlock" in "Touch ID and Passcode" (visible in the first screenshot).

• Use a safer password manager (such as KeePassium) than the Apple "Passwords" app (iCloud KeyChain).

🚨 In any case:

• Make sure that "Password Autofill" (in settings -> "Touch ID and Passcode") is set to ENABLED;

• When you enter your passcode in a public place (such as a bar, bus or train), make very sure that nobody gets to see you enter it.